




When Hungary began negotiating the Europe Agreement (EA) on
association, one of the most important goals was that it should re-
flect (as expressively as possible) the ambition of Hungary to attain
full membership and that it should establish a kind of link between
the process of association and accession. Thus the association was
considered as a preparatory stage leading to future membership.
This also meant, in Hungary’s opinion that the agreement had to
contain elements assuring the intention of the partners to go be-
yond simple free trade and facilitate real integration.1
In the field of trade relations, Hungary’s basic goal was the cre-
ation of free trade in industrial products, including steel and textile
products (which were treated as special categories in the European
Community and were regulated earlier by voluntary restraint
agreements), together with the complete elimination of all trade
barriers. In the timetable of achieving free trade, the Hungarian
delegation wanted to fully assert the principle of asymmetry, re-
flecting the different level of the partners’ economic development.
This meant that by Hungarian intention the European Commu-
nity (EC) should have consolidated the elimination and suspension




Hungary also requested the immediate elimination of the EC du-
ties on as many as possible industrial goods. Hungary for its part
was to eliminate its duties as gradually as possible.
Hungary wanted to see substantial and immediate concession in
market access for agricultural products. The Hungarian delegation
had concrete proposals and a list of requests. The list was rather
ambitious: apart from requesting 50-100% levy reduction, it in-
cluded products considered as the “hard core’ of the EC agricul-
tural policy. Among the Hungarian ideas was the aim to form a
customs union, as some of the earlier association agreements con-
cluded by the EC included provisions on the creation of a customs
union. Including this goal into the EA could have been mainly a
symbolic element reflecting the strong intention to become mem-
ber. On the other side, from economic point of view, creating a
customs union in a relatively short time would have risked to raise
a lot of problems due to internal difficulties related to the transfor-
mation process and to the East European economic environment.
In the field of the opening of the EC labour market the starting
expectation of the Hungarian delegation was to establish either
EC level or bilateral quotas with member states for Hungarian
workers. The Hungarian negotiators’ position was that consider-
able liberalisation must be reached concerning the possibilities al-
lowing Hungarian labour into Community services (including
transportation, which was of particular importance at that time)
and that the partners would take steps toward the free but asym-
metric movement of capital. It was a Hungarian claim that the EA
should lay down concrete forms and possibilities for broad political
and economic cooperation and that the EC should offer solid fi-
nancial assistance. The original concept was that this assistance
would have been recorded (with defined annual amounts) in a fi-
nancial protocol. Concerning the financial protocol the Hungarian
delegation did not submit concrete numerical proposals because
even the Hungarians did not fully agree on the issue.
Outcome and compromises of the negotiations
During the first stage of negotiations, which can be characterised
as an offensive period from Hungary’s point of view, it became
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clear that the EC’s concept and mandate differed on some points
from the Hungarian requests. The Community mandate did not
tie, in any form, the association with further full membership. The
process leading to industrial free trade was conceived by the EC
in two stages (but without a complete timetable) with the insertion
of a Community checking, which would make it possible to stop
or to delay market liberalisation. In this period of negotiations the
EC had no genuine reaction to the basic Hungarian proposals of
phasing out duties. The EC mandate did not allow the liberalisa-
tion of the movement of labour and did not schedule any engage-
ment for financial assistance.
The continuation of the negotiations and the (even partial)
meeting of the Hungarian requests necessitated a modification of
the EC mandate. It was done four month after the starting of the
negotiations. The second stage of negotiations could be charac-
terised by the tendency that more and more details had been con-
cretely fixed after a modification of the Community’s negotiating
principles. 
A very soft and vague wording about the link between associa-
tion and full membership became finally acceptable for the Hun-
garian delegation. This wording without any obligation for the
EC was put in the final text of the EA. There was a compromise
on this question: the text expressed a much less explicit EC com-
mitment than was originally expected by the Hungarian negotia-
tors. It reflected the EC’s view that association and accession were
two different processes. 
In the question of establishing free trade area between the part-
ners the EC gave up the principle of progressing in stages with in-
terim checking. This opened the way for negotiating concretely
the full timetable of the elimination of duties. The EC flatly re-
jected the possibility of a customs union. At the same time it for-
mulated a proposal for the phasing-out of its industrial duties,
which (although with a few Hungarian objections) was not far
from the financial version already acceptable for Hungary. On the
other hand, the EC asked for a grater degree of liberalisation of
the Hungarian import duties than was originally proposed by the
negotiators, especially in the first years of the EA. This reflected
the EC’s intention to weaken the asymmetry. Its proposals con-
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cerning the weakening of the right to special, unilateral safeguard
measures on the part of Hungary also intended to modify the
asymmetry. At the same time, the EC did not show at this stage
any willingness to decide the definitive elimination on quantitative
restrictions on the textile products and had no real reaction or
counter-proposal to Hungarian requests concerning agricultural
concessions. In an informal way the EC offered some opening of
agricultural markets, but these did not satisfy the Hungarian re-
quests neither for the product coverage nor for the level of levy
reductions.
The new EC mandate and the modified and less rigid standpoint
of the Community negotiators resulted in some proposals con-
cerning the free movement of workers, services and capital. They
offered rather modest changes in the conditions of access to the
EC labour market. This was very far from the Hungarian proposals
based on explicit quotas for Eastern European workers. On the
other hand, concerning capital movement and services, the EC
wanted to see much stronger liberalisation in Hungary. At this
stage of negotiations no comforting results were achieved in these
three areas. The EC’s position remained low-key on the question
of financial assistance, especially concerning definite amounts. At
the same time partners successfully (without major contradictions)
fixed most of the parts of the text determining the different fields
and forms of economic and political cooperation.
In the middle of negotiations, it became clear and was outlined
which questions the partners could successfully negotiate (or were
close to a compromise) and which problems could not be settled
on the basis of the then mandate because of the differences in part-
ners’ points of view. Here we have to mention on the EC side the
timetable of liberalisation of textile trade, the opening of the agri-
cultural markets, the possibility of the Hungarian workers to have
access to the labour market and the question of the financial assis-
tance. On the Hungarian side the most problematic issues were
the opening of the market of services and the degree of the liber-
alisation of capital flows. Questions about mutual regulation of
general and specific safeguard measures were also raised in this
phase of negotiations but there were no irreconcilable differences
of opinion.
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Before the final third stage of negotiations it became more or less
clear that the negotiations could only be concluded if the EC mod-
ified its position and at the same time Hungary accepted some com-
promises, changing its standpoint in a way that its original requests
were reduced. This re-interpretation of positions took place on
both sides before the last two concluding rounds of negotiations. 
At that stage, the EC was already inclined to accept (even if in-
directly) a final deadline for the liberalisation of trade in textile
products. This timetable was (and that was a compromise on the
Hungarian part) longer than in the case of most of the other in-
dustrial products. It was also an involuntary compromise that the
Hungarian delegation modified its first and original proposal con-
cerning the elimination of industrial duties and quantitative re-
strictions in Hungary. Anyway, the original proposal to liberalise
the import regime (especially for the first years of the agreement)
was rather modest, was practically no more than a gesture and was
based on a long timetable. Nevertheless, Hungary could avoid in
a satisfactory degree hurting the principle of asymmetry. The ex-
traordinary pressure coming from the Community delegation con-
cerning bigger and faster industrial trade concessions in the Hun-
garian import regime could be partly explained by the fact that
Polish and (at that time) Czechoslovak negotiators accorded more
important liberalisation to the EC in the first stages of free trade
than Hungary did. Thus, it may be said, that there is strong link
and interaction between similar negotiations conducted by the
EC/EU in parallel with several partners.
The proposals of the EC for opening the agricultural market al-
ready showed important changes in comparison with its original
and more modest concept. This more or less corresponded to the
Hungarian request list. The price for this compromise was that the
relatively important asymmetry in favour of Hungary had to be re-
duced. The EC negotiators achieved this by concentrating bargain-
ing on the product coverage and the volume of preferential quotas.
It is interesting to note that the final set of requests of the EC rep-
resented a sort of shopping list in which specific products and con-
cessions could be linked to concrete member states. The negotiat-
ing staff of the Commission evidently tried to “sell the deal” to
member states by satisfying the specific requests of each of them.
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As a compromise, Hungary had to accept a rather weak commit-
ment from the EC in opening the labour market. At the same
time, in the field of liberalisation of capital movement and trade
in services, the principal Hungarian interests could be asserted
(with some exceptions), since the opening in these areas remained
rather limited. 
The partners also arrived at a compromise on the issue of finan-
cial assistance, which earlier evoked strong aversion within the
member states. The agreement, although it did not fix precise
amounts of money, determined the possible long-term forms of
financial assistance to Hungary (e.g. Phare, EIB loans etc.).
Europe Agreement and further 
steps on the way to EU membership
Despite its compromises, the Europe Agreement played important
and in some field essential role in reorientation and substantial up-
grading of Hungary’s trade relations, in modernisation of its struc-
ture and enforced market economy type trade policy discipline.
The EA contributed to the modernisation of the economy, created
favourable conditions for a massive inflow of foreign direct invest-
ments. 
From political and economic point of view and from the point
of view of legal harmonisation, the Europe Agreement became an
indispensable and decisive step on the way to the accession. It was
a sort of starting point and at the same time offered a framework
for successful preparation for membership. This process was espe-
cially efficient in the field of trade policy integration, since the
biggest part of the EA’s provisions was directly or indirectly inked
to trade and its regulation. Nevertheless, after the entry into force
of the Europe Agreement, starting from the mid 1990s, the im-
plementation of the EA and the process of preparation for the ac-
cession in the EA framework were going parallel with another new
process and framework of deep legal harmonisation. 
The Cannes Summit of the European Council in 1995 offered
to associated countries willing to become members a well-detailed
programme of legal harmonisation and adjustment of the laws to
the acquis communautaire. The programme took the form of so-
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called White Book. On the basis of the principal fields of harmoni-
sation indicated in the White Book Eastern European countries
elaborated their national programmes of the adoption of the acquis.
The parallel implementation of the Europe Agreement and the
Hungarian national program of the adoption of the acquis con-
tributed to be prepared from the legal, administrative and institu-
tional point of view to a smooth integration in the EU, in its single
market and in its common policies, including common commercial
policy. Besides that these two frameworks created a solid staff of
specialists and professionals in different ministries and authorities,
together with their networks. These were the essential elements
of the successful management of the accession process.
Trade policy slippages in the period of association
This chapter contains an overview of those Hungarian trade policy
measures taken during the 1990s that meant a certain deviation
from the general rule, tendency and logic of the liberalisation
process.2 In most of the cases of the practical application of these
measures there is nothing special. They are frequently used in the
international trade policy practices. Nevertheless, they reflect a sit-
uation when the existing trade policy regulation is being consid-
ered not protective enough or when specific public policy and sec-
toral considerations prevail over the general tendency.
Probably the most important general trade policy deviation from
the prevailing logic, having an across-the-board effect was the in-
troduction in March 1995 of the import surcharge of 8 percent,
implemented on the erga omnes basis. It was one of the main fea-
tures of the March 1995 package of stabilisation measures de-
signed to address serious macroeconomic imbalances. Its tempo-
rary character was stressed from the introduction. This measure
was notified to the WTO and justified by the Hungarian govern-
ment on balance-of- payments grounds. The surcharge was appli-
cable to imports from all sources and covered all products except
primary energy products. It was refundable in the case of machin-
ery imported for investment purposes. As the surcharge was in-
2 This chapter and the next one are based on Meisel (2005)
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cluded in the selling price upon which VAT was levied, the overall
restrictive effect of the surcharge considerably exceeded 8 percent.
It was gradually reduced to 6% from 1 October 1996, 4% from 10
March 1997 and 3% from 15 May 1997 before being eliminated
on 1 July 1997.
As far as the measures taken on the basis of the national customs
legislation are concerned, one of them was introduced in 1992,
just after the entry into force of the Europe Agreement. At that
time Ford was considering to make important investments in Hun-
gary and as part of the incentive package, besides tax and other
preferences allowed by the legislation of that time, trade prefer-
ences also were shaped. It meant that customs tariff specification
of the vehicles of the Ford Transit category were modified so as
this vehicle was able to enjoy duty free market access, thus having
on important preference as compered to the competitors. In a very
short time this measure was sharply contested by the European
Commission because of the discrimination incompatible with the
Europe Agreement. The Hungarian authorities could not re-es-
tablish the original duty because it would have contradicted to the
stand still provision of the EA. So the 0% duty remained in force
for all the types of the vehicles of this category. 
The other measure of this kind was the increase of certain not
bound in the GATT agricultural duties. At that time a lot of do-
mestic criticism was formulated concerning the agricultural trade
scheme of the EA and the sudden increase of agricultural imports
from the EU, associated with the impact of the Agreement. Nev-
ertheless, besides the market protection effect, this step may be
considered as a symbolic gesture in favour of agriculture, which is
reflected by the fact that tropical products were also included in
this regulation. The prevailing motivation besides this gesture was
budgetary consideration to increase customs revenue.
The Europe Agreement contained unilateral provision allowing
the associated states to take exceptional measures to temporary
protect infant industries and those undergoing restructuring. The
timetable and conditions of such measures have been fixed in the
EA. Shortly after the entry into force of the Interim Agreement,
in February 1992, Hungary formulated a request to use this tool
in the case of 16 products, among them passenger cars that really
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could have been considered as subject to infant industry clause (re-
member Suzuki and GM that opened new plants in Hungary). Af-
ter long lasting consultations Hungary withdrew from the request
list a lot of products and the EU accepted as justified the tempo-
rary increase of duties in the case of 8 products, belonging to 3
product groups. (See Table 1.) So it is justified to conclude that
Hungary was able to benefit from this possibility only to a limited
extent, especially as compared to some other associated countries.
General safeguard clause was the most frequently used market
protection tool of the Hungarian import regime before the acces-
sion to the EU. This fact is reflected in Table 2. Hungarian au-
thorities introduced erga onmes based safeguard measures in three
cases and this happened before the entry into force of the WTO
agreement. After 1995 such measures have been taken in trade
with Eastern European countries, republic of the CIS, not mem-
bers of the WTO. Utilisation of this instrument is seemingly con-
centrated on relatively few industries. Application of the general
safeguard clause by Hungary was the most frequent in the steel
sector, followed by cement industry including products made from
asbestos.
Table 1. 
Measures taken on the basis of infant industry or restructuring clause
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Source: Meisel, 2005, p.210.
Besides the above mentioned slippages of Hungarian trade policy
some other also should be quoted. 
In the 1990s Hungary, like almost all of the European trading
partners, several times used import restrictions on the basis of phy-
tosanitary and veterinary regulations. From time to time Hungary
applied such restriction vis-a-vis the EU members and CEFTA
countries.
Speaking of internal measures affecting imports an important
step should be mentioned. Under the Customs Duty Law of 1995,
imports of cars older more than four years were prohibited be-
tween 1995 and 2000, on environmental and safety grounds. An
exception involved specialised older vehicles, which were allowed
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to be imported, provided they passed a special technical test. Along
with rather high tariffs on cars imported from MFN partners this
measure benefited domestic carmakers and also EU and CEFTA
producers enjoying growing tariff concessions.
Turning now to export regulation, here one can also observe
some backsliding. These entirely concern agricultural trade. Hun-
gary during the 1990s several times applied temporary, export re-
strictions on certain agricultural products (mainly animal feeds
wheat and sweet corn) on the basis of shortage clause. As the sta-
tistical and information system of the Hungarian agriculture was
far from being transparent, it is difficult to judge about the justi-
fication of such measures.
Determinants of the Hungarian trade
policy in the period of association
It is not easy to point on a few evident determining elements that
shaped Hungarian trade policy during the 1990s. Determinants
sometimes are hidden and in many cases their impact is not direct
but is often interrelated. So the following description is only on
attempt to discover some possible elements that played role in the
Hungarian trade policy formulation.
Probably, the most important determinant of the Hungarian
trade policy during the 1990s was a strong commitment to achieve
a successful transition to market economy, to advance in the inte-
gration in the world economy and to establish as close links a pos-
sible with the European Union, taking into consideration the ac-
cession to the EU as a strategic objective. These commitments may
explain the fact that the strategic and dominant tendency of eco-
nomic and trade policy liberalisation – despite some slippages –
was maintained. Thus institutional and legal instruments, both
GATT/WTO objectives and preferential agreements enforced this
general track. Certainly, in some cases and periods, especially in
the first years of the 1990s, there was a certain discrepancy be-
tween the pace of liberalisation optimal from the point of view of
the internal transformation and that prescribed by external com-
mitments. It is also true that external agreements limit the room
of autonomous actions. Nevertheless this external institutional set-
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ting served as an important stabilising element of the liberalisation.
The starting of the accession negotiations even reinforced this im-
pact. Obviously trade policy can be hardly shaped and implement-
ed without certain interactions with other internal policies. The
direct link between trade policy and its major backsliding in Hun-
gary during the 1990s is evident in the case of the macroeconomic
stabilisation program and the introduction of the overall import
surcharge. Apart of this measure, macroeconomic policy did not
directly affect trade policy formulation, at least it did not enforce
any other deviation from the general line.
Referring to the slippages of trade policy analysed in the previous
section, a clear determining impact of financial and budgetary con-
siderations can be observed in the case of the increase of agricul-
tural duties. 
Developments and backsliding of trade policy on sectoral level
can be explained differently.
In Hungary far most of the protective measures (in the form on
safeguards) were taken in steel sector. Here, it seems, the negative
consequences of – to some extent – premature liberalisation of the
quantitative regime, the lack of a clear industrial policy as well as
of regional development policy, and, as a result employment prob-
lems were compensated by increasing the level of trade policy pro-
tection.
Partly this is true for the cement industry, where the bargaining
power of the actors is much stronger, although the economic sit-
uation was similar to that in steel production.
In the paper industry, which also enjoyed market protection, a
strong foreign company acquired the most important production
plants and shortly after this, it was able to prove potential injury
of imports that led to the application of a safeguard measure.
These two cases demonstrate the fact – which was predicted in
early 1990s – that a more powerful foreign company is better
placed in requesting and argumenting for protective measures as
compared to traditional domestic firms. It should be noted that
this situation somewhat changed and domestic companies also
have learned how to protect their interests.
A rather coherent picture can be observed in the car industry. In
the beginning of the 1990s this was an entirely new industry in
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Hungary. During the association talks Hungary was able to resist
the strong pressure of the EU aiming at a rather fast liberalisation
of this sector. According to the provisions of the Europe Agree-
ment trade of passenger cars was liberalised only at the last stage.
A rather strong tariff protection was maintained in relation with
MFN countries, which was often subject to criticism, mainly by
the USA. This high level of protection was complemented be-
tween 1995 and 2000 by imposing ban on the imports of cars old-
er than four years.
It is interesting to note that there were traditional sectors that
remained relatively less protected, although professional interest
groups of them were permanently arguing for stronger protection.
The pharmaceutical industry can be mentioned as examples. One
should not forget, certainly, that trade of pharmaceuticals is not a
pure trade policy issue and is closely related to the social security
system. This trade till 2001 was subject to individual licensing but
the representatives of the industry always complained of perma-
nent overlicensing.
As in most of the European countries, including first of all the
EU, trade policy regulation of the agricultural sector is a specific
issue. Trade policy formulation in this sector is highly influenced
by internal political considerations. This is the same in Hungary,
as in many Central and Western European states. Internal trade
policy disputes in the 1990s were immediately transmitted on the
highest political level. That made Hungarian agricultural trade pol-
icy rather unstable and vulnerable. But this was only one element
of instability.
Probably more important element of instability was, on one
hand, the lack of a well-defined agricultural policy. It is rather dif-
ficult to build up a consistent agricultural trade policy without the
basic policy. On the other hand – interpreting the matter in a sim-
plified way – the system of information on the agricultural sector
(who is producing, what is producing, how much is producing?)
could be established only with difficulties. It was almost impossible
to formulate a coherent trade policy on this unstable basis. This
was reflected in symbolic – from political point of view – measures
(like tariff increase in 1994), or in sudden and questionable re-
strictions on exports. Contrary to some other Central and Western
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European countries, the political sensitivity and economic uncer-
tainty represented the main determinants of the agricultural trade
policy in Hungary and not the existence of a strong agricultural
lobby. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to note that in this sector trade
policy slippages were not more frequent than in some others.
Hungarian experience and general lessons
During the establishment of the base of a new relationship and co-
operation, the parties are usually  motivated on the one hand by
the external political situation, but on the other hand by their own
political and economic interests. For Hungary, the changes in the
beginning of the 1990s made it possible to reconstruct, in a polit-
ical and economic sense, its relations with Western Europe and its
integration institutions.  In early 1990s the EC was led by the need
to react to the changes in the partner countries when offered as-
sociation agreements. At that time “association” as a form of co-
operation had been present since the 1960s and 1970s in the ex-
ternal relations of the EC. Concerning the new content of the
association, the EC only had broad ideas based on the precedent
of favourable and unfavourable experiences. The lack of a definite
association concept had serious disadvantages. However, it should
be remembered that precisely this fact could open a relatively clear
way for Central European countries to shape the Europe Agree-
ments with definite ideas and to force the Community to renew
its concepts. Anyway, a conclusion offered by this experience is
that in general the problems to be negotiated are in many cases
not EU initiatives but may be presented to a big extent by the ne-
gotiating partner as well. The situation of the early 1990s is rather
similar to the present one, when EU seeks to find new forms of
cooperation (i.e. in the form of DCFTAs) with potential partners
in Eastern Europe. 
If there is enough political motivation and willingness, the Eu-
ropean Union can change its negative or reserved attitude even on
the toughest questions. Hungary had a theoretical and practical
possibility to influence effectively the provisions and the rules of
the Europe Agreement and in many cases was able to overcome
the absolute rigidity of the EC in some areas. 
Experience of Hungary’s Association Agreement
However, the Hungarian evaluation of the situation showed
some weaknesses. The Hungarian negotiating team was not comp-
letely aware of the extent of future problems deriving from the do-
mestic economic situation of that time, from the reorientation of
its economic relations and from the inheritance of the past. It is a
question to what extent these problems were predictable. Anyway,
detailed and well-founded studies on the potential effects of the
emerging new trade policy framework would have been needed. 
The advantages from the new trade regulations and concessions
can be truly exploited only by a dynamic economy. When Hun-
garian economy was not dynamic and its sectors were not com-
petitive enough (i.e., if there were no products to export and thus
the market access possibilities could not be utilised), most of the
benefits of the mutual liberalisation go to the strongest and more
competitive partner. Hungary had to witness such situations and
had to face their consequences. Besides that, when only one of the
partners, the stronger one can make use of liberalisation, the orig-
inal asymmetry is easily eroded.
On the basis of the experience of Hungary (and apparently on
that of the other Central and Eastern European countries) some
short conclusions can be formulated.
– Political determination seems to be an essential element of elab-
orating a successful agreement. The concept of negotiations and
the process of implementation – if possible - should be backed
by broad internal consensus (political elite, government institu-
tions, business, population, etc.). 
– Clear definition of the country’s interests may influence in an
efficient way the course and the outcome of the negotiations.
It can only based on well-developed and prompt cooperation
and interaction between the different actors of administration,
business and civil society. 
– Stability of the trade policy administration is desirable. 
– It is important to mention the need to be able to form coalitions
with member states. It is not only in Brussels where trade policy
decisions are elaborated. A country being in a process of nego-
tiations and close cooperation should not neglect the “capitals”
(i.e. administration) of the member states. 
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– The Hungarian experience shows that trade policy concessions
are undoubtedly important, but the stability of domestic macro-
economic conditions is even more essential in order to take prof-
it from the renewed framework of cooperation with the Euro-
pean Union.
– A trade agreement incorporates and enforces trade policy disci-
pline and stability. Nevertheless, authorities of an associated
country should not be “shy” or “servile” in using trade defence
instruments, when needed. On the other hand, they have to re-
sist to misuse them.
– In the process of upgrading the relations with a partner like the
European Union, it seems to be essential to establish a workable
framework of dissemination of information and dialogue with
all partners, practically with the society. Unfortunately this was
a weak part of the preparatory work in Hungary before the as-
sociation. The consequences were unfounded illusions in short
run and disillusions after.
References
– Inotai, András (2001): Completing Transition: The Main Chal-
lenges. The Case of Hungary, In: Gerstenberger, W. (ed.):
Aussenhandel, Wachstum und Produktivitat – Fragen in Vorfeld
der EU-Erweiterung, Ifo Institut, Dresden
– Juhász, Endre (1993): Társulási szerződésünk az Európai
Közösségekkel és azok tagállamaival (Hungary’s Europe Agree-
ment wit the European Communities and its member states),
in: Mádl, F. (ed.): Európajogi tanulmányok 1. (Studies in Eoro-
pean Law), Budapest, Eötvös Lóránd University
– Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, Elzbieta (2000): Lessons from Trade
Liberalisation in Transition Economies: Ten Years Experience
and Future Challenges, Discussion Paper No. 78., Foreign
Trade Research Institut, Warsaw
– Meisel, Sándor (1995): Hungary, in: Mizsrei, K. and Rudka, A.
(eds.): From Association to Accession. The Impact of the Asso-
ciation Agreements on Central Europe’s Trade and Integration
with the European Union, Institute for EastWest Studies, War-
Experience of Hungary’s Association Agreement
saw, Prague, Budapest, Kosice, New York
– Meisel, Sándor (2005): Hungary: Stability of Trade Policy and
its Determinants, Chapter 6. in: Drabek, Z. (ed): Can Regional
Integration Arrangements Enforce Trade Discipline? The Story
of the EU Enlargement, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005, pp.193-220
83
